Political Liberalism: Moral, not Epistemological

This essay is a critical response to M. Garreta Leclercq's "Liberalismo politico, justificacion publica y verdad". Garreta Leclercq argues that the traditional theory of epistemic justification is conceptually irreconcilable with Rawlsian political liberalism. In addition, Garreta Leclercq holds that even though Rawls's own conception of political justification satisfies political liberalism's standards, it would be objectionable on other grounds. On the basis of such conside-rations, Garreta Leclercq concludes that Rawls does not develop an adequate justification of political liberalism's conceptual core. I disagree. I argue that in Political Liberalism, Rawls grounds liberal neutrality on the basis of moral rather than epistemological reasons. I conclude that -Garreta Leclercq's arguments fail to provide adequate support for claiming that Rawls grounds the conceptual core of political liberalism in a misguided way.