INSURABILITY AND MORAL HAZARD IN AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE MARKETS

被引：130

|

作者：

CHAMBERS, RG

机构：

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 71卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1242016

中图分类号：

F3 [农业经济];

学科分类号：

0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：604 / 616

页数：13

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