Does ownership structure matter in explaining derivatives' use policy in French listed firms

被引:3
|
作者
Boubaker, Sabri [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Mefteh, Salma [4 ]
Shaikh, Junaid M. [5 ]
机构
[1] ESSEC Tunis, DEFI, 4 Rue Abou Zakaria El Hafsi, Montfleury Tunis 1089, Tunisia
[2] IHEC Sousse, Finance, Sousse 4054, Tunisia
[3] Univ Paris Est, Inst Rech Gest, F-94010 Creteil, France
[4] Paris Dauphine Univ, ESSCA Business Sch, F-49003 Angers, France
[5] Curtin Univ Technol, Sch Business, Dept Accounting, Miri 98009, Sarawak, Malaysia
关键词
derivatives' use; corporate governance; CEO ownership; France;
D O I
10.1504/IJMFA.2010.033291
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of ownership structure on derivatives' use policy. Using data for 262 French non-financial listed firms, the results show that the two decisions of whether to use derivatives or not and the extent of derivatives use are not affected by the same variables. CEO ownership has a negative effect on the decision to use derivatives, whereas CEO tenure length influences negatively the extent of derivative use. CEO age impacts positively both decisions, whereas firms that grand stock options to their CEOs do not rely too much on derivatives. However, the presence of outside blockholders seems not to affect the firms' hedging policy.
引用
收藏
页码:196 / 212
页数:17
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