In 1951, the French created a special unit in Indochina, the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Ae 'roportes (GCMA), to deal with the unconventional side of Vietminh strategy. Its initial purpose was to destroy Vietminh subversion of the rural population and not to harass Vietminh units. The GCMA developed an efficient process of swiftly taking control of large zones in the Vietminh rear areas through the use of native contact Special Mission teams. These infiltrated the population, gathered intelligence, and established guerrilla bands. This process enabled the GCMA to increase its strength dramatically through this specialised native recruitment to 14,000 men during the latter half of 1953. An important lesson from this experience is that the isolated teams were militarily weak and thus vulnerable to any concerted Vietminh offence. Counterinsurgency thus cannot be successful without an effective coordination between conventional and unconventional forces to counter this vulnerability.