MORAL HAZARD AS A QUESTION OF INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY - A PEDAGOGICAL EXPOSITION

被引：0
|
作者：
MUROTA, T
机构：
来源：
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1990年 / 31卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.15057/7825
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
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页码：23 / 33
页数：11
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