EFFECTS OF MONITORING AND TRADITION ON COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS - AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRINCIPAL-AGENT DYADS

被引：13

作者：

CONLON, EJ ^{[1
]}

PARKS, JM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MINNESOTA,CTR IND RELAT,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1990年 / 33卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/256583

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：603 / 622

页数：20

共 36 条

[1] MONITORING IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS
JOST, PJ
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 1991, 147 (03): : 517 - 538
[2] EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY
GAREN, JE
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1994, 102 (06) : 1175 - 1199
[3] COMPENSATION AND TRANSFER PRICING IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
BESANKO, D
SIBLEY, DS
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1991, 32 (01) : 55 - 68
[4] Delegation of monitoring in a principal-agent relationship
Strausz, R
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1997, 64 (03): : 337 - 357
[5] Principal-agent approach to energy executive compensation design
Bocharova, Irina
Rymanov, Alexander
ENERGY REPORTS, 2022, 8 : 41 - 47
[6] Bonus or flat wage? An experiment into the principal-agent problem
Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike
Mietek, Arleta
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 2010, 217 (03) : 1141 - 1149
[7] Teaching tools - A simple principal-agent experiment for the classroom
Ortmann, A
Colander, D
ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1997, 35 (02) : 443 - 450
[8] Performance in principal-agent dyads: The causes and consequences of perceived asymmetry of commitment to the relationship
Ross, WT
Anderson, E
Weitz, B
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1997, 43 (05) : 680 - 704
[9] A study of escalating commitment in principal-agent relationships: Effects of monitoring and personal responsibility
Kirby, SL
Davis, MA
JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, 1998, 83 (02) : 206 - 217
[10] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
RADNER, R
ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

← 1 2 3 4 →