UNIVERSAL BANKING;
RISK-TAKING;
COMMERCE;
INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY;
SOCIAL WELFARE;
D O I:
10.1016/0378-4266(94)00037-9
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of banks taking equity stakes in firms under conditions of imperfect information and moral hazard. Two cases of bank control over investment decisions are analyzed. In the first, the bank does not control the investment decisions of the firm. Here, the investment efficiency is higher and bank risk is lower for an optimal positive level of bank equity holdings. However, in the case when the bank has veto power over investment proposals by the firm, there is a trade off between increased investment efficiency and increased bank risk.
机构:
Univ New Hampshire, Peter T Paul Coll Business & Econ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Durham, NH 03820 USAUniv New Hampshire, Peter T Paul Coll Business & Econ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Durham, NH 03820 USA
Liu, Yixin
Zhang, Yilei
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ North Carolina Charlotte, Belk Coll Business, Dept Finance, Charlotte, NC 28223 USAUniv New Hampshire, Peter T Paul Coll Business & Econ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Durham, NH 03820 USA
Zhang, Yilei
Jiraporn, Pornsit
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Penn State Univ, Great Valley Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA 19355 USAUniv New Hampshire, Peter T Paul Coll Business & Econ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Durham, NH 03820 USA