THE CENTRALITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY TO (A FUTURE) ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

While environmental ethics has successfully established itself in philosophy, as presently conceived it is still largely irrelevant to grappling the global ecological crisis because, as Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, ethical philosophy itself is in grave disorder. MacIntyre's historically oriented recovery of virtue ethics is defended, but it is argued that even MacIntyre was too constrained by received assumptions to overcome this disorder. As he himself realized, his ideas need to be integrated and defended through philosophical anthropology. However, it is suggested that current defenders of philosophical anthropology have not done it justice. To appreciate its importance it is necessary accept that we are cultural beings in which the core of culture is the conception of what are humans. This is presupposed not only in thought but in social practices and forms of life. This was understood by Aristotle, but modernity has been straightjacketed by the Seventeenth Century scientific revolution and Hobbes' philosophical anthropology, identifying knowledge and with techno-science and eliminating any place for questioning this conception of humans. The only conception of humanity that could successfully challenge and replace Hobbes' philosophical anthropology, it is argued, is Hegel's philosophical anthropology reformulated and developed on naturalistic foundations. This involves subordinating science to a reconceived humanities with a fundamentally different role accorded to ethics, placing it at the center of social life, politics and economics and at the centre of the struggle to transform culture and society to create an ecologically sustainable civilization.