ELUSIVE MEDIAN VOTER

While some political scientists have maintained that politics has little, if anything, to do with governmental output, economists have looked at expenditures as reflecting median voter outcomes. They have used the median voter framework extensively, both in theoretical work and in empirical analysis. This paper reviews the empirical work, concluding that the studies fail to indicate that actual expenditures correspond in general to those desired by the median voter. The economic studies fail to identify whether expenditures are at the level desired by the median voter or at some multiple of this level. They also fail to identify whether the median voter is pivotal or a voter at some other fractile is pivotal. Moreover, the basic median voter model is rarely tested against competing theoretical or statistical models. In some studies parameter estimates are not consistent with the theoretical model designed on the basis of the median voter hypothesis. The economic studies suggest that expenditures depend not only on the preferences of voters but also on the structure of political institutions. The presence of bureaucratic threats is offered as an institutional setting that can result in expenditures significantly in excess of those desired by the median voter. © 1979.