ON THE DEFINITION OF AN EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY IN THE PLAYING THE FIELD MODEL

被引:5
|
作者
CRAWFORD, VP
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80271-1
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
This paper considers a strengthening of Maynard Smith's definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or "ESS", discussed by Vickers & Cannings [Vickers, G. T. & Cannings, C. (1987). On the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy. J. theor. Biol. 129, 349-353]. Vickers & Cannings showed that the stronger definition was equivalent to Maynard Smith's for the pairwise random matching model, as long as the game played by matched pairs has a finite number of pure strategies. This paper uses a different argument to extend their equivalence result to the "playing the field" model. © 1990 Academic Press Limited.
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页码:269 / 273
页数:5
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