THE EFFECTS OF RISK-AVERSION ON PRODUCTION DECISIONS IN DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATIONS

被引：5
|
作者：
ARYA, A [1 ]
FELLINGHAM, JC [1 ]
YOUNG, RA [1 ]
机构：
[1] PENN STATE UNIV,COLL BUSINESS ADM,DEPT ACCOUNTING & MIS,UNIV PK,PA 16802
来源：
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 1993年 / 39卷 / 07期
关键词：
AGENCY THEORY; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY LOSS; RISK AVERSION;
D O I：
10.1287/mnsc.39.7.794
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
This paper presents a principal-agent model in which subsequent to contracting the risk averse agent becomes informed about the production process. Communication of the agent's information is always valuable. The optimal contract given this information asymmetry is characterized by less production and a larger risk premium than when information is symmetric, leading to an efficiency loss. Comparative statics show that the loss in expected production increases as the agent becomes more risk averse.
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页码：794 / 805
页数：12
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