CEO inside debt, asset tangibility, and investment

被引:7
|
作者
Lu-Andrews, Ran [1 ]
Yu-Thompson, Yin [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Connecticut, Ctr Real Estate & Urban Econ Studies, Finance, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
[2] Oakland Univ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Adv Financial Accounting, Rochester, MI 48063 USA
关键词
Investment; Agency problem; Asset tangibility; Executive compensations; Inside debt; Liquidation value;
D O I
10.1108/IJMF-10-2014-0163
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Purpose - The authors intend to perform empirical analysis to test the theory proposed by Edmans and Liu (2011) that CEOs with more debt-like compensations care more about the liquidation value of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relations between CEO inside debt ratios and tangible assets ( i.e. asset tangibility, liquidation value, and fixed asset investment). Design/methodology/approach - The authors use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) contemporaneous and lead-lag regression analyses. They also use two-stage least-square (2SLS) regression analysis for robustness check. Findings - The findings are fourfold: first, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on asset tangibility of the firm; second, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on the liquidation value of the firm; third, CEO inside debt has a positive effect on the tangible asset investment (as measured by capital expenditures) of the firm; and fourth, these positive effects are found in both the contemporaneous year and the subsequent year and in both OLS and 2SLS frameworks. The research provides further evidence that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings exhibit safety-seeking behavior. The authors document direct proof for the theory proposed by Edmans and Liu (2011) that these CEOs, like any creditors, care a great deal of the asset tangibility and liquidation value of the firm. Originality/value - This study contributes to the existing literature by providing further empirical evidence to support that CEO inside debt holdings have impacts on firm investment decisions and capital allocations. Inside debt does help align the executive managers' personal incentive with firms' value, and mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and debt holders. This study provides significant empirical evidence to support the theory suggested by Edmans and Liu (2011) that CEOs with higher level of inside debt holdings do care a greater deal about the asset liquidation value of the firm, and these firms tend to invest more in tangible assets to preserve the liquidation value.
引用
收藏
页码:451 / 479
页数:29
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