EFFORT-INDUCING CONTRACTS

被引：0
|
作者：
ALVI, E
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS | 1992年 / 14卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1080/01603477.1992.11489914
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：523 / 545
页数：23
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