What Should Truth Do? -On the Normative Implications of Truth in Reference to the Pragmatic Turn of Jurgen Habermas' Consensus Theory of Truth

被引：0

作者：

Lin, Yuan-Tse

机构：

来源：

EURAMERICA | 2005年 / 35卷 / 02期

关键词：

consensus theory of truth; pragmatic turn; Habermas; pragmatics;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

In 1999 Habermas admitted that his consensus theory of truth fails as an effort to make the semantic concept of truth epistemological, because the identification of "truth" with "rational assertability" involves an antinomy. For either instances of rational assertability are fallible or they are infallible by virtue of their being made in an ideal speech situation. To avoid this antinomy Habermas claims that truth is not an epistemological concept but a normative one. Its function is not to produce what is infallible, rather, its function is to regulate speech acts. In the following essay I explain wherein Habermas' pragmatic turn consists. In the process, the normative implications of the concept of truth are clarified.

引用

页码：363 / 404

页数：42