BROKERING MERGERS - AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF REPRESENTATIVES

被引:3
|
作者
KESNER, IF [1 ]
SHAPIRO, DL [1 ]
SHARMA, A [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV MASSACHUSETTS, SCH MANAGEMENT, AMHERST, MA 01003 USA
来源
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 1994年 / 37卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
10.2307/256707
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Agency theory suggests a conflict of interest in the relationship between investment bankers and the firms they represent during merger negotiations. We examined this proposition by scrutinizing the association between the compensation bankers earned and the premiums paid in mergers. Results show a positive relationship between premium and compensation for investment bankers of both target and bidder firms. This relationship indicates alignment between the goals of the targets and their representatives but suggests misalignment, and hence conflict of interest, in the case of bidders.
引用
收藏
页码:703 / 721
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条