DETECTING ALL EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES

被引:14
作者
BOMZE, IM
机构
[1] Department for Statistics and Computer Science, University of Vienna, Vienna
关键词
COPOSITIVITY; EFFICIENT SEARCH; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; EXTREMAL EQUILIBRIA; STABLE EQUILIBRIA; PLAYING-THE-FIELD MODELS;
D O I
10.1007/BF00941470
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In evolutionary game theory, the central solution concept is the evolutionarily stable state, which also can be interpreted as an evolutionarily stable population strategy (ESS). As such, this notion is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept in that it requires an additional stability property. In the present paper, an algorithm for detecting all ESSs of a given evolutionary game consisting of pairwise conflicts is presented which both is efficient and complete, since it involves a procedure avoiding the search for unstable equilibria to a considerable extent, and also has a finite, exact routine to check evolutionary stability of a given equilibrium. The article also contains the generalization of these results to the playing-the-field setting, where the payoff is nonlinear.
引用
收藏
页码:313 / 329
页数:17
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