INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODELS

被引：642
作者：
SHEPSLE, KA
机构：
来源：
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | 1979年 / 23卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2110770
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
引用
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页码：27 / 59
页数：33
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