JUDGMENTS OF SOCIAL-JUSTICE - COMPROMISES BETWEEN EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY

被引:91
|
作者
MITCHELL, G
TETLOCK, PE
MELLERS, BA
ORDONEZ, LD
机构
[1] Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley
关键词
D O I
10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.629
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Political economists agree that a trade-off exists between equality and efficiency. Using a hypothetical society paradigm, we manipulated the mean income (representing efficiency) and income variability (representing equality) of distributions of wealth and the correlation between wealth and effort within a society. Subjects made all pairwise comparisons of distributions within societies of differing meritocracy. A ''maximin'' principle best described trade-off resolution strategies when effort and outcome were weakly linked: People maximized the minimum standard of living within a society. A compromise principle best described preferences when income was tightly linked to effort: People rejected distributions in which some citizens fell below the ''poverty line'' but maximized efficiency above this constraint. Ideological polarization was pronounced under moderate meritocracy; here liberals could focus on the role of chance and conservatives on the role of effort and ability.
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页码:629 / 639
页数:11
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